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On 30 December 2020, the EU Commission announced that the EU and China “in
principle” concluded the negotiations on a Comprehensive Agreement on Investment
(CAI). The announcement was met with applause from Germany’s car industry and
critique from Reinhard Bütikofer, chair of the European Parliament’s delegation
for relations with China. The geopolitical rationale of the agreement has been
questioned by commentators suggesting that the EU handed China a “strategic
victory” while others claimed that the CAI would open the Chinese market in sectors
so far closed to European traders and investors.
When comparing the CAI with other trade and investment agreements of the EU,
it becomes apparent that the CAI is an agreement sui generis. The CAI is neither
a typical free trade agreement as it lacks any rules on trade in goods nor is it a
classical investment agreement as it does not contain any rules on investment
protection. A point of contention is the potential impact of the CAI on sustainable
development and labour rights. This leads to the question: How does the CAI
measure against the standards of the constitutional law of the EU relating to its
external relations?  It appears that there has been only a limited assessment of
the CAI from a human rights perspective, which is especially problematic in light of
recent political developments in China. Once finalized, the agreement will require
consent by the European Parliament which maintained a critical position to the
negotiations and listed a number of requirements including repeated references to
human rights. Based on the terms of the CAI currently publicized, it is doubtful that
these requirements will be met.
An agreement in investment and services
liberalisation but not on investment protection
At the outset, it should be noted that a (draft) text of the agreement is not yet publicly
available. While earlier drafts have been seen by journalists and some researchers,
no text has been officially released or leaked to the public. An assessment therefore
needs to be based on the press release of the Commission of 30 December and on
what is known about earlier drafts including prior statements by the Commission. It
should be noted that despite promises towards increased transparency, no official
draft texts were released since the beginning of the negotiations seven years ago.
The commercial essence of the CAI will be the market access for investment and
services. This means that investors and exporters will face fewer obstacles and
discrimination when offering their services on and investing in the markets of the
EU and China. Market access is a typical feature of trade agreements and can be
found in all recent EU Free Trade Agreements, including the EU-UK Trade and
Cooperation Agreement. Technically, the CAI will therefore contain provisions
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prohibiting quantitative and other restrictions on market access such as monopolies
and quotas as well and non-discrimination obligations, in particular the obligation
to treat foreign investors and services no less favourable than domestic investors/
services (national treatment) or other foreign investors/services (most-favoured
nation treatment). These obligations will, however, not apply without exceptions as
both sides will be able to exclude certain measures and sectors from their scope. In
trade parlance, this technique this referred to as the “negative-list approach” (More
details can be found in a recent study)
Apparently, the EU obtained concessions from China in some sectors of key
interest to European industries, including car manufacturing and services (such as
cloud services, financial services, private healthcare and environmental services,
international maritime transport and air transport-related services) but other sectors
will be excluded from the agreement. A full assessment of the commercial value and
political impact of the agreement will only be possible once the Annexes with the
limitations and specific concessions will be released and can be compared to other
agreements concluded by the EU and by China respectively.
The CAI will also contain rules on subsidies and regulatory procedures, but the
details are not yet known. As a consequence, it remains to be seen if and to which
extent the EU Commission’s claim that the CAI “help to level the playing field for EU
investors” can be sustained.
Unlike the name of the CAI suggests, the agreement does not include rules on
investment protection. Instead, the EU and China agreed to continue to negotiate on
such rules including investment dispute settlement within two years of the signature
of the CAI. In other words, the standards which are typically included in bilateral
investment treaties (BITs) and which can also be found in the agreement between
the EU and Canada (CETA) on investment protection such as compensation
for expropriation or fair and equitable treatment will not be part of the CAI. Yet,
concluding an investment protection agreement was a major negotiating goal of the
EU and an essential element of the EU’s negotiating objectives. In particular, the EU
sought to conclude such an agreement with China to replace the BITs China has
with most EU Member States. This will not be possible with the CAI and therefore
the Member States’ BITS remain in place.
The lack of an agreement on investment does not come as a total surprise in light
of the significant divergences of both sides on the topic. The EU intends to follow
its modernised approach which includes a Multilateral Investment Court (MIC) while
China seems to favour the traditional investor-state dispute resolution (ISDS) based
on ad hoc tribunals. This mechanism was, however, considered inconsistent with
the right to access to an independent tribunal according to Article 47 para 2 of the
EU Charter on Fundamental Rights by the ECJ in its Opinion 1/17 on CETA (For
comments see here and here). It is therefore unclear if the EU has any scope for
manoeuvre in this regard.
To conclude, the CAI is neither a typical free trade agreement as it lacks any rules
on trade in goods (tariffs, non-tariff barriers, technical standards, trade remedies)
and on trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) nor is it a classical
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investment agreement as it does not contain any rules on investment protection.
Even if such rules will be added later, the CAI will remain unique as agreements
covering trade and investment, but not addressing goods or TRIPS are uncommon in
international trade law.
Sustainable development and labour rights – in an
agreement with China?
 As most recent EU trade agreements, the CAI will contain provisions on sustainable
development and labour standards. Typically, these provisions contain commitments
not to lower environment and labour standards in order to attract investment and
to respect existing international obligation of the respective party. The Commission
claims that “this is the first time that China agrees to such ambitious provisions with
a trade partner.” Yet, obligations to maintain existing obligations are of limited legal
value. If China “agreed to effectively implement the Paris Agreement on climate
change as well as to effectively implement the International Labour Organisation
Conventions (ILO) it has ratified” as the Commission states, China basically restated
an international obligation it has anyway.
However, according to the Commission “China has also agreed to make continued
and sustained efforts to ratify the ILO fundamental Conventions on forced labour”.
This refers to ILO Conventions 29 of 1930 and 105 of 1957 which China consistently
refused to sign and ratify even though they are two of the eight ILO Fundamental
Labour Conventions. While a change in this policy would be revolutionary, it seems
highly unlikely that the CAI will incentive China to engage in such a change. Treaty
language referring to efforts to ratify conventions does not confer any binding
obligations on the party of an agreement. The issue of forced labour has long
been a key area of divergence during the negotiations, yet observers agree that
China remains firm on rejecting any international obligations in this field. Hence,
the obligations on sustainable development and labour in the CIA may not change
anything on the ground.
“Guided by the principles which have inspired its
own creation”?
The last point leads to the more fundamental question if the CAI meets the standards
of EU constitutional law on external relations. Article 21 TEU holds that EU’s foreign
policy shall be “guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation,
development and enlargement” which include the universality and indivisibility of
human rights and fundamental freedoms. As these principles also apply to the
common commercial policy (see Article 207 para 1 TFEU) trade and investment
agreements can also be measured against that standard.
One instrument to ensure that these principles are observed are impact
assessments of the relevant agreements. In this regards, the EU Commission
undertook a Sustainability Impact Assessment (SIA) evaluating the CAI in 2017
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aiming at identifying potential risks to human rights, the environment, and labour
standards caused by the agreement. The SIA identified certain risks but did not
address fundamental human rights problems in China. The SIA has also been
criticized on methodological grounds as the study only consulted with a limited
number of stake-holders in the human rights field and fails to provide data on the
impact of the agreement on indigenous and minority groups such as the Uyghurs.
Hence, the SIA provides an incomplete picture of the potential impact of the
agreement on human rights.
The limited assessment of the CAI from a human rights perspective is especially
problematic in light of recent political developments in China, including the Hong
Kong National Security Law adopted in June 2020 which has been criticised as a
violation of Hong Kong’s Basic Law and of international human rights standards
as well as the most recent sentence of Chinese journalist Zhang Zhan to four
years imprisonment for challenging the Chinese government’s narrative about the
coronavirus pandemic only two days before the announcement of the agreement on
the CAI.
What’s next?
As pointed out above, a text of the agreement has not yet been published.
An agreement “in principle” only suggests that there are no major substantial
controversies any longer on the contents of the agreement. However, the negotiating
teams need to finalise the text which will then undergo legal and linguistic reviews
(sometimes called “legal scrubbing”). Once the text has been agreed on, it needs
to be signed by the representatives of the parties, which is the Council in the case
of the EU. As long as the CAI contains no provisions on investment protection, the
agreement will fall into the exclusive competence of the EU and Member States do
not have to sign and ratify the agreement.
The agreement also requires consent by the European Parliament which has
maintained a critical position to the negotiations and listed a number of requirements
for the CAI in 2013 including repeated references to human rights. Whether these
are met can only be fully assessed once the text has been released. Yet, doubts
seem in place based on what is known so far.
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